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JURISDICTION OF APPELLATE COURT
The jurisdiction of all appellate courts "shall be provided by statute."1 The Utah
Legislature has provided that the Utah Supreme Court may transfer "to the Court of
Appeals any case over which the Utah Supreme Court has original appellate
jurisdiction."2 Thus, even though the Court of Appeals does not have original
jurisdiction over this appeal,3 since the Utah Supreme Court has declined to take
jurisdiction of the same, the Court of Appeals now has proper jurisdiction of this
appeal.
STANDARD OF REVIEW AND
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
Summary judgment decisions present only questions of law.4 An appellate
court should "determine only whether the trial court erred in applying the governing
law and whether the trial court correctly held that there were no disputed issues of

1

Utah Const., Article VIII, §5.

2

U.C.A. § 78-2-3(4).

3

U.C.A. § 78-2a-3.

4

"A challenge to summary judgment presents only questions of law." West v.
Thomson Newspapers. 872 P.2d 999, 1004 (Utah 1994).
l

material fact."5 In this case, the facts were derived from stipulated facts and an
uncontested affidavit.
Hodsen and Anderson's claims before this and the trial court can be
summarized in two issues:
1. Does UMPA's prohibition on the truthful and non-misleading speech
between Hodsen and Anderson infringe on their fundamental rights of personal,
religious, and commercial speech, formulation of religious belief, and exercise of
religiously motivated conduct?
2. Has DOPL justified their infringement on the fundamental rights of Hodsen
and Anderson by a compelling governmental interest and use of the least restrictive
means possible to achieve that interest?
DETERMINATIVE LAW
Hodsen and Anderson rely on the following provisions of the Utah Constitution
to vindicate their rights of speech, religion, and self-determination:
All men have the inherent and inalienable right.. .to worship according
to the dictates of their conscience; . . . to communicate freely their
thoughts and opinions, being responsible for the abuse of that right.
Utah Const., Article I § 1 .

5

Ferree v. State. 784 P.2d 149,151 (Utah 1989).
2

The rights of conscience shall never be infringed. The State shall make
no law respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the free
exercise thereof;....
Utah Const., Article I § 4.

No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due
process of law.
Utah Const., Article I § 7.
No law shall be passed to abridge or restrain the freedom of speech or
of the press.
Utah Const, Article I § 15
Hodsen and Anderson rely on the following provisions of the United States
Constitution to vindicate their rights of speech, religion, and self-determination:
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of
speech, or of the press....
U.S. Const., First Amendment.
[N]or shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty or property,
without due process of law; nor deny to any persons within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
U.S. Const., Fourteenth Amendment.
The state statute used to justify deprivation of the constitutional rights of
Hodsen and Anderson is the Utah Medical Practices Act (hereinafter referred to as
the "UMPA"). The portions of UMPA that are relevant to this appeal are as follows:

(4) "Diagnose" means:
(a) to examine in any manner another person, parts of a person's body,
substances, fluids, or materials excreted, taken, or removed from a
person's body, or produced by a person's body, to determine the
source, nature, kind, or extent of disease or other physical or mental
condition;...
(d) to make an examination or determination as described in
Subsection 4(a) upon or from information supplied directly or indirectly
by another person, whether or not in the presence of the person or
attempting to make the diagnosis or examination.
U.C.A. §58-67-102(4).
Practice of medicine" means:
(a) to diagnose, treat, correct, or prescribe for any human disease,
ailment, injury, infirmity, deformity, pain or other condition, physical or
mental, real or imaginary, or to attempt to do so, by any means or
instrumentality, and by an individual in Utah or outside the state upon
or for any human within the state;...
(d) to use, in the conduct of any occupation pertaining to the diagnosis
or treatment of human diseases or conditions in any printed material,
stationary, letterhead, envelopes, signs, or advertisements, the
designation "doctor," "doctor of medicine," "physician," "surgeon,"
"physician and surgeon," "Dr.," M.D.," or any combination of these
designations in any manner which might cause a reasonable person to
believe the individual using the designation is a licensed physician and
surgeon, and if the party using the designation is not a licensed
physician and surgeon, the designation must additionally contain the
description of the branch of the healing for which the person has a
license.
U.C.A. § 58-67-102(8)(a) and (d).

4

In addition to the exemptions of licensure in Section 58-1-307, the
following individuals may engage in the described acts or practices
without being licensed under this chapter:...
(3)(a)(i) a person engaged in the sale of vitamins, health foods, dietary
supplements, herbs, or other products of nature, the sale of which is not
otherwise prohibited by state or federal law; and
(ii) a person acting in good faith for religious reasons, as
matter a matter of conscience, or based on a personal belief, when
obtaining or providing any information regarding health care and the
use of any product under Subsection 3(a)(i); and
(b) Subsection 3(a) does not:
(i) allow a person to diagnose any human disease, ailment,
injury, infirmity, deformity, pain, or other condition; or
(ii) prohibit providing truthful and non-misleading information
regarding any and all of the products under Subsection (3)(a)(i);
(4) a person engaged in good faith in the practice of the religious
tenets of any church or religious belief, without the use of prescription
drugs;
U.C.A. § 58-67-305(3) and (4).
There are no administrative rules interpreting these statutes.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. Nature of the Case
This case was brought as a civil rights action challenging the application of
1996 amendments to the Utah Medical Practices Act ("UMPA") to Hodsen and
Anderson. Declaratory judgment and injunctive relief was sought to ensure that the
5

exchange of truthful and non-misleading information regarding herbs and other lawful
products between Hodsen and Anderson would not continue to be prohibited.
B. Proceedings
The complaint was filed on February 9, 1996. (Record at 3, (hereinafter
referred to as "R".))
A third amended complaint was filed on July 8,1996. (R. at 47.)
DOPL's answer was filed on January 6,1998. (R. at 251).
Stipulated facts were filed on May 6,1998. (R. at 272)
The Affidavit of Anderson was filed on May 12, 1998. (R. at 329).
DOPL filed for summary judgment on May 12,1998. (R. at 333).
Hodsen and Anderson filed for summary judgment on May 6, 1998. (R. at
285.)
Oral argument was held on May 13,1998. (R. at May 13,1998.)
C. Disposition of the Case
The trial court granted DOPL's summary judgment on June 30, 1998. (R. at
373.)
Hodsen and Anderson served a Rule 59 U.R.Civ.P. motion to alter or amend
the Judgment on July 10,1998; the original pleading was filed with the court on July
14, 1998. (R. at 375.)

6

The Rule 59 U.R.Civ.P. motion was denied on July 30,1998. (R. at 404.)
A Notice of Appeal was filed on August 27,1998. (R. at 418).
RELEVANT FACTS
Relevant stipulated facts agreed to by the parties in the trial court are as
follows:
Hodsen has a M.D. degree from University of California at Los Angeles and
a biochemistry degree from University of California at Berkeley. (R. at 273.) Since
the early 1980's, he has studied and engaged in research regarding various
biochemicals and their natural occurrence in herbal or nutritional (non-prescription)
supplements lawfully sold on the open market. (R. at 273.) Hodsen distributes these
products to chiropractors, physicians, other health professionals, health food stores,
and individuals. (R. at 273.) In 1983, DOPL staff determined that the activities of
Hodsen did not constitute the practice of medicine. (R. at 273.)
In various administrative hearings held from 1992 to 1993, DOPL determined
that Hodsen's use of information provided by a purchaser of herbs and other natural
products to determine what Hodsen recommended be purchased constituted the
practice of medicine. (R. at 275.)

Hodsen appealed that decision to the Fifth

Judicial District Court. (R. at 275.) In March of 1995, Judge Eves determined that
Hodsen was statutorily exempt from UMPA. (R. at 276.)

7

Anderson consulted with Hodsen during the time period that DOPL staff had
determined he was exempt from licensure requirements. Anderson had a health
condition which had not responded to conventional medical treatment that had been
applied. She followed the recommendation of Hodsen. Her condition has become
manageable and the quality of her life vastly improved. (R. at 274.) While Anderson
is and has been under the care of a licensed physician and acupuncturist, she also
seeks additional truthful and non-misleading information from Hodsen regarding
herbs and other non-prescription products of nature. (R. at 274.)
In 1996, the Utah Legislature amended the UMPA and revised the exemption
Judge Eves had relied upon in 1995 to find Hodsen exempt from medical licensure.
The Legislature provided that
[i]n addition to the exemptions from licensure in Section 58-1-307, the
following individuals may engage in the described acts or practices
without being licensed under this chapter:....
(3)(a)(i) a person engaged in the sale of vitamins, health foods,
dietary supplements, herbs, or other products of nature, the sale of
which is not otherwise prohibited by state or federal law; or
(ii) a person acting in good faith for religious
reasons, as a matter of conscience, or based on a
personal belief, when obtaining or providing any
information regarding health care and the use of any
product under Subsection 3(a)(i); and
(b) Subsection 3(a) does not:

8

(i) allow a person to diagnose any human disease,
ailment, injury, infirmity, deformity, pain, or other condition; or
(ii) prohibit providing truthful and non-misleading
information regarding any of the products under
Subsection 3(a)(i);6
On the face, the exemption under Subsection 3(a)(i) as clarified by Subsection
3(b)(ii) would exempt Hodsen's commercial sharing of truthful and non-misleading
sharing of information about herbs and other products of nature. The exemption
allowed under Subsection 3(a)(ii) would also seem to protect both Anderson's and
Hodsen's good faith desire "to give and receive information for religious reasons, as
a matter of conscience, or based on a personal belief, when obtaining or providing
any information regarding health care and the use of any" herbs or other product of
nature.
However, the process by which relevant information is exchanged between
Hodsen and Anderson makes them ineligible to receive the benefit of exemptions
that on their face seem to apply directly to their situation. Subsection 3(b) indicates
that any person who is otherwise exempt from licensure under Subsection 3(a) may
not "diagnose any human disease, ailment, injury, infirmity, deformity, pain, or other
condition."7 "Diagnosis" occurs when a person makes "a determination . . .of the

6

U.C.A. § 58-67-305(3).

7

U.C.A. § 58-67-305(3)(b)(i).
9

nature or extent of [a] physical... condition... from information supplied directly or
indirectly from another person, whether or not in the presence of the person making
. . . the diagnosis."8
Anderson and Hodsen exchange truthful and non-misleading information as
follows:
(1) Anderson approaches Hodsen and shares with him any of the following
information:
(a) gives him a written diagnosis by a licensed health care
provider indicating she has a certain health condition, or
(b) explains that on her own she used home medical
testing equipment or studied medical literature and has
concluded she has a certain health condition, or
(c) states she had an intuitive or spiritual impression, or
is told in a religious blessing or otherwise, that she has a
certain health condition; or
(d) indicates orally or in writing that she had experienced
symptoms of a health condition.
(2) Using any or all of the information provided by Anderson, Hodsen
identifies what he believes the nutritional needs of the person most
likely are, and determines what lawful herbal or other products of nature
would likely contribute to satisfying those needs;9 and

8

U.C.A. § 58-67-102(4)(d); (a); (d).

9

"Hodsen's approach to advising customers about the use of herbs or nutritional
products is based on the use of regular prayer to guide his interpretation of scientific
data and information provided by the customer for the purpose of making
10

(3) With or without disclosing his rationale for his recommendation,
Hodsen advises Anderson or any other potential customer that she
should purchase the identified lawful herbs or other products of nature,
which the person is free to purchase from Hodsen, or any other person,
or source, and may refer her to or supply her with peer reviewed
academic or religious materials regarding the ingredients of the herbs
or other products of nature.
(R. at 282-83.)
Thus, the 1996 UMPA specifically forbids Anderson to provide Hodsen with
truthful and non-misleading information (which can come from a licensed physician)
because it allows Hodsen to make "a determination.. .of the nature or extent of [a]
physical . . . condition [of Anderson]. . . from information supplied directly or
indirectly from [Anderson or ] another person, whether or not in the presence of the
person making . . . the diagnosis."10

Simply stated, if Anderson was to provide

Hodsen with a statement from her licensed physician that she was suffering from
high blood pressure and Hodsen relied on the information as a beginning point when
he was determining what herbs or other products of nature he would advise that she
use, Hodsen would be guilty of practicing medicine because he "diagnosed" her
condition. Because of this restriction in Subsection 3(b)(i), Anderson and Hodsen are

recommendations. He believes that he can and does receive divine assistance
regarding these matters. Hodsen believes his knowledge obtained through formal
training in biochemistry and medicine also enable him to interpret the meaning of the
information provided to him." (R. at 274.)
10

U.C.A. § 58-67-102(4)(d); (a); (d).
li

unable to avail themselves of those exemptions from medical licensure allowed (1)
under Subsection 3(a)(i) for those involved in marketing herbs and other products
of nature, and (2) under Subsection 3(a)(ii) for those desiring information regarding
these products as a matter of conscience, religious faith, or deeply held personal
belief. This interpretation is in accord with the earlier determination of Judge Eves
that the pre-1996 UMPA exchange of information between Hodsen and Anderson
constituted the practice of medicine because Hodsen was "diagnosing." (R. at 276.)
In addition, DOPL has decided that Hodsen's desired use of the designation
M.D. on business cards or articles for journals (with an explanation included stating
"Graduate of UCLA School of Medicine" and "Research Biochemist not in Medical
Practice") constitutes the unlicensed practice of medicine. (R. at 280-81.) This is so
because DOPL fears that the use of the designation and disclaimer might cause a
reasonable person to believe that Hodsen was a licensed physician or surgeon and,
in connection with Hodsen's business, may be deceptive or misleading regarding
Hodsen's status or qualifications insofar as it relates to licensure. (R. at 281.)
DOPL's absolute prohibitions on the ability of Hodsen and Anderson (or any other
person) to exchange information with Hodsen, and his inability to use the title "M.D.",
as clarified above, have interfered with Hodsen's on-going business of consulting,
selling, and working with herbs and other products of nature. (R. at 281-82.)

12

Anderson has also been damaged by DOPL's refusal to deny her a right to
exchange truthful and non-misleading information with Hodsen. She desires to
receive directly from Hodsen truthful and non-misleading information regarding what
would be appropriate use of herbs and other products of nature for her. (R. at 330.)
Anderson desires to obtain information in an effort to formulate her religious beliefs
regarding the use of wholesome herbs and other products of nature with "prudence
and thanksgiving" pursuant to Doctrine and Covenants 89:10-11.11 (R. at 330.) By
obtaining and sharing information regarding the prudent use of herbs Anderson will
more fully live her religious beliefs, entitling her to both physical and spiritual
blessings. (R. at 330.) Anderson believes that Hodsen has received and will receive
divine inspiration regarding her needs. (R. at 330.) Anderson cannot formulate her
religious beliefs and exercise them without exercising her free speech right to obtain
and share truthful and non-misleading information about her health condition from
Hodsen. (R. at 331.) Anderson believes that the restrictions of UMPA has harmed
her, damaged her physically and spiritually, and diminished her quality of life. (R. at
331)

11

"And again, verily I say unto you, all wholesome herbs God hath ordained for
the constitution, nature, and use of man - Every herb in the season thereof, and
every fruit in the season thereof; all these to be used with prudence and
thanksgiving." Doctrine & Covenants 89:10 - 1 1 .
13

Another religious tenent of Anderson is to obey the law. (R. at 331). Anderson
was afraid that if she did exchange information with Hodsen, she would be soliciting
a felony, a criminal act in and of itself. (R. at 331.) She seeks clarification of the law
to ensure that her efforts to formulate and live her religious beliefs regarding a health
code do not cause her to violate another religious tenent prohibiting civil
disobdience. (R. at 331.)
Being unsure of the status of the law and the lawful exercise of their rights,
both Anderson and Hodsen sought injunctive and declaratory relief to ensure that the
UMPA did not infringe on their fundamental rights of speech and religion. (R. at 281 82 and 331.)
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The total prohibition of certain speech imposed by the 1996 UMPA has
prevented Hodsen and Anderson from exchanging truthful and non-misleading
information so that Hodsen may give advice to Anderson regarding the use of herbs
and other products of nature as formulates and exercises religious beliefs as well as
makes personal health decisions in addition to those she makes with her licensed
physician and acupuncturist. In addition, Hodsen's speech has also been infringed
by the refusal of DOPL to allow him to use in business cards and published articles
the designation "M.D." when such is clarified by written disclaimers stating he is

14

graduate of UCLA Medical School, working as a research biochemist and not in the
practice of medicine. This complete ban on speech places DOPL's administration
of UPMA in direct conflict with the constitutional rights of Hodsen and Anderson to
speech, formulation and practice of religious belief. The unique religious provisions
of Utah's Constitution and the exemptions allowed by UPMA justify giving Anderson
protections for religious thought and speech that are greater than the norm. There
is similarly no need to limit the protection Utah's Constitution affords to commercial
speech.
DOPL can not constitutionally justify this direct infringement by UMPA on
Hodsen and Anderson's fundamental rights of speech as well as formulation and
exercise of religious belief by either a compelling governmental interest — an
interest of the highest order—or demonstrate it has used the least restrictive means
in doing so. DOPL's total ban on truthful and non-misleading speech between
healthy, educated, and competent adults regarding advice on the use of herbs and
other lawful products of nature presumes an in loco parentis role that is normally
limited to intervention on behalf of abused or neglected children.

The express

allowance of significant similar expression undermines any claim that the expression
prohibited in this case is an interest of the highest order. Previous precedent limiting
exercise of express rights under the Utah State Constitution or upholding criminal
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prosecution under UMPA are distinguishable factually and as a matter of law (both
as to constitutional issues raised and intervening precedent since the earlier rulings).
There are no express constitutional provisions that mandate the speech and religious
rights of Hodsen and Anderson are to be minimized by either balancing their
congruent claims against each other or allowing DOPL to overlook the restraints in
Utah's Declaration of Rights when it fulfills the duty of the Executive to see that
statutes are faithfully upheld. In this case, the undisputed evidence fails to show any
health or moral crisis that requires the abandonment of any one fundamental right
to preserve the present or future ability of the State to protect the exercise of all
others by Hodsen, Anderson, or the people generally.
DOPL has also failed to use the least restrictive means of protecting Hodsen
and Anderson from their exchange of truthful and non-misleading information. The
1996 Legislature failed to follow its earlier framework used in the 1986 Dietician
Certification Act when it restricted the right of individuals involved in evaluating,
recommending, and providing services regarding herbs and other products of nature
only when a designation of certified dietician was used by the person providing the
advice. The 1996 Legislature also failed to consider the option used by forty-seven
other states to not include the exchange of information and reliance thereon as part
of their definition of diagnosis. Finally, DOPL's total ban on Hodsen's truthful use of

16

the designation "M.D." is not tempered by allowing his voluntary offer to place
disclaimers of being in medical practice.
Hodsen and Anderson have demonstrated by stipulated evidence, and briefed
in the lower court and in this court, that the total ban on truthful and non-misleading
speech arising from DOPL's application of UMPA to them has directly conflicted with
their fundamental rights of speech as well as formulation and exercise of religious
beliefs. Neither DOPL nor the 1996 Legislature have been able to demonstrate that
the assumed in loco parentis protection being imposed on healthy, educated and
rational adults satisfies a compelling interest — or interest of a highest order—and
that their newly imposed total ban on particular speech between Hodsen and
Anderson is the least restrictive means that can be used to meet the objective of
protecting the public from their own choices. Thus, under the facts of this case,
UMPA cannot be applied by DOPL to defeat the exercise by Hodsen and Anderson
of their rights of speech as well as formulation and exercise of religious belief.
ARGUMENT
I. Refusal to Allow Hodsen and Anderson to Exchange Truthful
and Non-Misleading Information Infringes on
Fundamental Rights
Hodsen and Anderson are asking this court to protect their constitutional right
to private or religious speech, commercial speech, formulation of religious belief,
17

and free exercise of religious practice. The Utah constitutional provisions relied upon
by Hodsen and Anderson are self-executing because they
articulate a rule sufficient to give effect to the underlying rights and
duties intended by the framers. . . .and 'if no ancillary legislation is
necessary to the enjoyment of a right given, of the enforcement of a
duty imposed.'12
Constitutional protections under the First Amendment of the United States
Constitution have been binding on the State of Utah since 1940.13

A. Unique Provisions in the Utah's Law Afford
Greater Protections to Anderson
Than the Norm
Anderson is entitled to protections under the Utah Constitution's unique
religious provisions as well as those of the First Amendment that are afforded
because of the text of UMPA.

12

Bott v. DeLand. 922 P.2d 732, 737 (Utah 1996) (citation omitted).

13

Cantwell v. Connecticut. 310 U.S. 296, 308, 60 S.Ct. 900, 84 L.Ed. 1213
(1940). While at times federal court rulings in the establishment area have been
inconsistent and possibly unprincipled, see Society of Separationists v. Whitehead.
870 P.2d 916, 931 (Utah 1993), the "strict scrutiny" constitutional analytical
framework regarding free exercise of religion has been aapplied for the sake of
argument in one recent case interpreting portions of the Utah Constitution. Jeffs v.
Stubbs. 917 P.2d 1234 (Utah 1998).
18

1. Protection Under the Unique Provisions of the Utah Constitution
The Utah Constitution is not "hostile, suspicious or even unfriendly" to
religion.14 Indeed, Anderson's entitlement to constitutional protection to formulate
religious belief are uniquely protected by the provisions of the Utah Constitution.
Two textual provisions of the Utah Constitution offer explicit protection to rights of
conscience and religious sentiment, concepts that deal with thought, belief, and
understanding. Even though the record in the Utah Constitutional Convention
provides limited insight to these provisions, perhaps a "page of history"15 provided
by the 1890 United States Supreme Court decision upholding a denial of voting
rights and jury assignments to members of the dominant faith solely on the basis of
religious belief,16 explains why the Utah delegates provided more immediate and
explicit protection than their neighboring states.
Article I § 4 of the Utah Constitution provides that "[t]he rights of conscience
shall never be infringed." Neither any other state constitution nor the United States

14

Society of Separationists v. Whitehead. 870 P.2d 916, 939 (Utah 1993)
(citation omitted.)
15

Jd. at 921 (citation omitted.)

16

See Davis v. Beason. 133 U.S. 133, 10 S.Ct. 299, 33 L.Ed. 837 (1890),
overruled in part Roemer v. Evans. 517 U.S. 620,116 S.Ct. 1620,134 L.Ed.2d 855
(1996).
19

Constitution has such a provision. No court outside the State of Utah has ever cited
this provision.17
Article III § 1 of the Utah Constitution provides that "[p]erfect toleration of
religious sentiment is guaranteed." Like the text of the Utah Enabling Act, similar
texts in other states only provide that "perfect toleration" will "be secured."18 The
selection of self-executing language in the Utah Constitution not only ensured court
application of the same,19 but also indicates a desire to guarantee a higher level of
protection to religious thought and belief than that found or stated elsewhere.

17

See Jane L. v. Banaerter. 794 F. Supp. 1528 (1992), reversed on other
grounds. Jane L. v. Bangerter, 61 F.3d 1493 (1993); Albright v. Board of Educ. of
Granite School Dist.. 765 F. Supp. 682 (D.C.Utah 1991); Jeffs v. Stubbs. 917 P.2d
1234(Utah 1998); Society of Separationists v. Whitehead. 870 P.2d 916 (Utah
1993); Society of Separationists v. Taoaart. 862 P.2d 1339 (Utah 1993); State v.
DeMille. 756 P.2d 81 (Utah 1988); State v. Ball. 685 P.2d 1055 (Utah 1984);
Manning v. Sevier County. 517 P.2d 549 (Utah 1973); In re State ex. rel. Black. 3
Utah 2d 315,283 P.2d 887 (Utah), cert, denied 350 U.S. 923,76 S.Ct. 211,100 L.Ed
87 (1955); Gubler v. Utah State Teacher's Retirement Board. 192 P.2d 458 (Utah
1948).
18

See Arizona Const., Art. XX H First; Oklahoma Const., Art. I § 2; North Dakota
Const., Art. XIII, § 1, U 1; South Dakota Const., Art. XXII, U First; Wyoming Const.,
Art. 21 § 25.
19

The review of this language by the Utah Supreme Court appears to have
presumed it was self-executing. See Society of Separationists v. Whitehead, supra.
870 P.2d at 928-929, 934-934; In re State in Interest of Black, supra. 283 P.2d at
905.
20

All of the foregoing demonstrates a basis for inferring an intent to provide
maximum protection for the formulation of religious belief. Read together,20 these
two provisions strongly support Anderson's right to obtain truthful and nonmisleading information from Hodsen that will assist her in formulating her religious
beliefs regarding how she can use of wholesome herbs with "prudence and
thanksgiving"21 to meet her physical and religious needs.22 (R. at 330)
2. Protection Under the First Amendment
of the United States Constitution
Beyond the rights stated above, Anderson's need for information to formulate
religious belief and religious speech can receive protection under the free exercise
of religion clause of the First Amendment of the United States Constitution. In
addition to application of a "hybrid" claim, the First Amendment requires that "laws
burdening religious practice must be of general applicability." M As written, the
UMPA exemptions indicate that it is not a law of general applicability.

20

"When construing provisions of our constitution, we must read the document
as a whole, giving effect to all provisions." West v. Thomson Newspapers. 872 P.2d
999, 1015 (Utah 1994).
21

Doctrine and Covenants 89:11-12.

22

None of Utah Supreme Court cases upholding earlier versions of the UMPA
have reviewed these constitutional provisions in conjunction of the UMPA.
23

Church of the Lukumi Babalu Ave v. City of Hialeah. 508 U.S. 520,113 S.Ct.
2217, 2232,124 L.Ed.2d 472 (1993) (citations omitted).
21

Further, the Free Exercise Clause "'protects religious observers against
unequal treatment.'"24 Hodsen's speech is treated by DOPL as commercial, public
speech. (If it was considered to be religious, he would have an exemption under §
53A-12-30(5), U.C.A.) Hodsen's commercial speech is not exempt under the
marketing exemption for herbs and other products of nature (§ 53A-12-30(4) U.C.A.,)
because his providing of advice includes his reliance on a statement by Anderson
concerning a real or imagined condition. (R. at 274 and 330). Thus, Anderson —
who believes Hodsen is both competent in his educational training and professional
development regarding herbs and a recipient of divine inspiration regarding the
same — is confronted under UMPA with a "lose-lose" situation when she desires to
exchange truthful and non-misleading information in order to formulate religious
beliefs regarding the use of wholesome herbs "with prudence and thanksgiving."25
(R. at 330-1) First, she may speak with those who are solely religiously motivated
but have no medical or biochemical training regarding herbs. Second, she may
speak with those who may be licensed in medicine (and who may also not have
training regarding herbs or other products of nature) without confidence that they will
seek and receive divine inspiration regarding the advice given to Anderson, (which

24

id- at 2232 (citations omitted).

25

Doctrine and Covenants 89:11.
22

advice will be used in the formulation of her religious beliefs.) (R. at 283 and 330-1)
Thus, as applied to her, Anderson faces an inability to obtain truthful and nonmisleading information necessary to formulate her religious beliefs from a person
who (1) has training and experience that demonstrates competence in providing it
and (2) a demonstrated ability to seek and receive divine inspiration regarding the
advice given. (R. at id.)
The Utah Legislature has created this dilemma for Anderson because it
exempted those who exchange information or advice for religious or other deeply
held reasons when dealing with other medical and health matters except as it relates
to herbs or other lawful products of nature. Regardless of the Utah Legislature's
motivation, the 1996 UMPA has prohibited the speech of Anderson (and those who
believe in religious directives regarding herbs and other products of nature) while the
religious or deeply held beliefs of others regarding different aspects of medicine or
health practice remain unrestricted. (R. at 280)
Thus, because of Utah's unique UMPA provisions and exemptions, UMPA's
application in this situation cannot satisfy the remnant of Free Exercise protection
afforded by the First Amendment of the United States Constitution.

23

B. The Rights Anderson and Hodsen Seek to Protect Are "Fundamental"
DOPL's application of the UMPAto prohibit the exchange of truthful and nonmisleading information between Hodsen and Anderson interferes with their rights
of speech, formulation of religious belief, and exercise of religious belief. Each of
these rights asserted has been recognized by both the Utah and the United States
Supreme Courts as being fundamental by reason of their specific inclusion in the text
of the constitutions as well as modem judicial interpretation of the traditions of our
state and nation.
Hodsen and Anderson's freedom of personal, private, or religious speech are
protected by express textual provisions of the constitutions of Utah and United
States.
The First Amendment to the Constitution of the United States prohibits
Congress from making any law "abridging the freedom of speech";
Article I, Section 1 of the Constitution of Utah guarantees everyone the
inherent and inalienable right "to communicate freely their thoughts and
opinions, being responsible for the abuse of that right," and Section 15
thereof provides "no law shall be passed to abridge or restrain the
freedom of speech
"26
The Utah Supreme Court has observed that
[fjreedom of speech is not only the hallmark of a free people, but is,
indeed, an essential attribute of the sovereignty of citizenship. . .

26

West Gallery Corporation v. Salt Lake City Board of Commissioners. 586 P.2d
429, 430 (Utah 1978).
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.Freedom of speech is. . .essential for the psychological, moral,
intellectual, and political well-being of individuals.27
The United States Supreme Court has indicated that because of the protections of
the First Amendment, governments "may not unduly suppress free communication
of views, religious or other, under the guise of conserving desirable conditions."28
Freedom of speech is not just giving information; it "necessarily protects the right
to receive."29
Hodsen also claims his right to freedom of commercial speech in his business
and use of the designation M.D. (on his business cards and professional writing) are
protected by the same express textual provisions of the Utah and United States
Constitutions that apply to personal speech. Unlike the United States Constitution,
no case law under the Utah Constitution has determined that commercial speech
receives a different level of protection than that allowed personal speech.
Nonetheless, even using a less stringent federal standard, Hodsen's commercial
communication in this case should be protected.

27

Cox v. Hatch. 761 P.2d 556, 558 (Utah 1988).

28

Cantwell v. Connecticut, supra, 310 U.S. at 308,60 S.Ct. at 905,84 L.Ed. 1213
(1940).
29

Martin v. City of Struthers. 319 U.S. 141, 143, 63 S.Ct. 862, 863, 87 L.Ed.
(1943).
25

Commercial speech that is not false, deceptive, or misleading can be
restricted, but only if the State shows that the restriction directly and
materially advances a substantial state interest in a manner no more
extensive than necessary to serve that interest
The State's burden
is not slight; the free flow of commercial information is valuable enough
to justify imposing on would-be regulators the costs of distinguishing
the truthful from the false, the helpful from the misleading, and the
harmless from the harmful.' . . .'[MJere speculation or conjecture' will
not suffice; rather the State 'must demonstrate that the harms it recites
are real and that its restriction will in fact alleviate them to a material
degree.'30
In addition to the unique protections afforded the formulation of religious belief
under the Utah Constitution, the right to engage in religiously motivated conduct is
expressly protected under both the Utah and United States Constitutions. Without
deciding the issue, the Utah Supreme Court adopted a form of analysis that
assumed that the Utah Constitution provided greater protection for religious conduct
than afforded by present interpretation of the United States Constitution by the
United States Supreme Court.31

Nonetheless, in spite of the limited federal

protections afforded religious objections to state laws of a general nature,32 such
limitations do not apply when, as in this case, (1) UMPA is not a law of general

30

Ibanez v. Florida Department of Business and Professional Regulation. 512
U.S. 136, 142-143, 114 S.Ct. 2084, 2088-89, 129 LEd.2d 118 (1994) (citations
omitted).
31

See Jeffs v. Stubbs, 917 P.2d 1234(Utah 1998)

32

Employment Div. Dept. of Human Res, v. Smith. 494 U.S. 872, 879,110 S.Ct.
1595, 1600, 108 L.Ed.2d 876 (1990).
26

application because of its many and varied exemptions, and (2) the religious
exercise is jointly exercised with another fundamental freedom such as speech.
In addition, Anderson has the right of personal autonomy and selfdetermination as guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment.
No right is more sacred or more carefully guarded, by the common law,
than the right of every individual to the possession and control of his
own person, free from all restraint or interference of others, unless by
clear and unquestionable authority of law.33
Indeed, "every human being of adult years and sound mind has the right to
determine what shall be done with his own body[.]M34 Anderson asserts the right to
receive information regarding lawful products necessary to help them decide what
actions they will take regarding their own health care and treatment.
C. As Applied, DOPL's Absolute Prohibition on Speech
Directly Conflicts with Hodsen's and Anderson's
Exercise of Fundamental Rights
UMPA's absolute prohibition on the exchange of truthful and non-misleading
information between Hodsen and Anderson as well as his use, with written
clarification, of the designation "M.D.", establish a direct conflict between the
regulatory conduct of DOPL and the fundamental rights of Hodsen and Anderson.

33

Cruzan v. Missouri Dep't. of Health. 497 U.S. 261, 269,110 S.Ct. 2841, 2846,
111 LEd.2d 224 (1990) (citations omitted).
34

Woodland v. Angus. 820 F. Supp. 1497,1504 (Utah 1993) (citations omitted).
27

Early in Utah's jurisprudence, the application of a statute to an individual could be
declared unconstitutional if it (1) "deprived a citizen of some right or privilege granted
by the Constitution," (2) "violated some right of the individual," (3) was "clearly
prohibited by some provision of the Constitution," or (4) was "unreasonable or
discriminatory."35 More recently, the degree of the required conflict has been stated
as "manifestly infringing] upon some constitutional provision"36 or being "clearly and
expressly prohibited by the Constitution."37
The stipulated facts in this case indicate that the conflicts between Hodsen
and Anderson's exercise of fundamental rights and the absolute prohibitions
imposed by the UMPA are real, direct and significant to each individual. Anderson
is impeded in her desire to ask for and receive information with both an holistic and
scientific basis which has been tempered by what she understands to be divine
guidance. (R. at 330) Anderson believes that this fusion of informed examination,
and sharing of knowledge with inspiration from a personal God is essential for both
her physical and spiritual well-being. (R. at 331) Hodsen is impeded in his desire
to not practice medicine today (R. at 273), but to carry out what he views as a "divine

35

Board of Medical Examiners v. Blair. 57 Ut. 516, 196 P.2d 221, 223 (1921).

36

Salt Lake City v. Ohms. 881 P.2d 884, 887 (Utah 1994).

37

Utah Farm Bureau Insurance v. Utah Insurance Guaranty Association. 564 P.2d
751, 753 (Utah 1997).
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mission to assist his fellow man in obtaining and properly using herbal and other
products of nature". (R. at 274)
Notwithstanding these direct conflicts, Hodsen and Anderson recognize that
"the First Amendment does not . . . guarantee absolute freedom of speech".38
Indeed, "[f]reedom of speech and religion are not unlimited licenses to do unlawful
acts under the label of constitutional privilege."39 For example, "[o]ne may not with
impunity make statements which constitute slander, or perjury, or treason."40
However, the mere fact that there are theoretical and practical limitations to the
exercise of fundamental freedoms does not license the state to abrogate them at its
convenience. The state's actions must fit within the narrow confines outlined below,
restraints which this court and the United States Supreme Court have already
recognized as being incumbent upon constitutional governments.

38

Cassidv v. Salt Lake County Fire Civil Service Council. 364 Ut.Adv.R. 6
(March 16,1999). citing Board of County Commissioners v. Umbehr. 518 U.S. 668,
116 S.Ct. 2342, 2347, 135 L.Ed.2d 843 (1996).
39

State v. Musser. 110 Utah 534, 546,175 P.2d 724, 731 (1946).

40

Shields v. Toronto. 16 Utah 2d 61, 69, 395 P.2d 829, 835 (1964).
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II. DOPL Has Not Constitutionally Justified Its Prohibition of Hodsen's and
Anderson's Speech, Formulation and Exercise of Religious Belief

The Utah Supreme Court has held that even though "statutes are presumed
constitutional until the contrary is clearly shown," 41 "[t]he burden is on [DOPL] to
justify such measures if they impinge on some fundamental right"42.

When

fundamental rights are infringed as noted above, DOPL must demonstrate there is
"(1) a compelling state interest in the result to be achieved and (2) that the means
adopted are 'narrowly tailored to achieve the basic statutory purpose"'43 or "the least
restrictive means" to do so have been used.44
These requirements are similar to that of the United States Supreme Court
which has "required the most exacting scrutiny in which a State undertakes to
regulate speech on the basis of its content."45 "For the State to enforce a content

41

Salt Lake City v. Ohms. 881 P.2d 844, 847 (Utah 1994).

42

State ex. rel. Division of Consumer Protection v. Rio Vista Oil. Ltd.. 786 P.2d
1343, 1350 (Utah 1990).
43

Wells v. Children's Aid Society of Utah. 681 P.2d 199, 206 (Utah 1984).

44

Jeffs v. Stubbs. 917 P.2d 1234 (Utah 1998).

45

Widmar v. Vincent. 454 U.S. 263, 276, 102 S.Ct. 269, 277, 70 L.Ed.2d 440
(1981).
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based exclusion it must show that its regulation is necessary to serve a compelling
governmental interest and that it is narrowly drawn to achieve that end."46
A. DOPL Has No Compelling Governmental Interest In This Case
The Utah Supreme Court has previously assumed that the regulatory
framework of DOPL served compelling governmental interests.
Title 58 indicates quite clearly that its general purpose is to provide for
the qualification, registration and licensing of persons who hold
themselves out to the public as having qualifications in specialized
areas which affect the public health, safety, or welfare and thus to guard
against unqualified persons deluding others into believing that they are
competent to render such specialized services.47
The Legislature is protecting the people from the quacks who would
deceive them into thinking they are receiving medical relief, when, in
reality, they are being deprived of their money without the remotest
possibility of cure. This type of quackery also prevents people who
may be or are in the dire need of competent aid by their either delaying
or foregoing proper treatment. These ill people think they are being
cured, when, in fact, they are receiving no real help.48

46

Frisby v. Schultz. 487 U.S. 474, 485, 108 S.Ct. 2495, 2500, 101 L.Ed.2d 420
(1988) (citations omitted).
47

Cannon v. Gardner. 611 P.2d 1207,1210 (1980) (This was in reference with
surveryors. It is interesting to note that the interest in question was overruled in this
case.)
48

State v. Hoffman. (Hoffman n. 558 P.2d 602, 605-606 (Utah 1976).
31

UMPA's total ban on truthful and non-misleading discussions of Hodsen and
Anderson can not be justified by a compelling governmental interest. This can be
shown in at least four ways.
1. Allowing Appreciable Damage to a Possible Rationale Indicates
the Interest Is Not Compelling
The de facto assumption of UPMA is that the State of Utah must act in loco
parentis to protect a healthy, educated and rational adult population when
exchanging truthful and non-misleading information used to formulate religious
beliefs and health decisions regarding herbs and other products of nature. To
constitutionally justify the same, DOPL must show that this rationale protects a
compelling governmental interest, an interest of the highest order.
It is established in our strict scrutiny jurisprudence that 'a law cannot
be regarded as protecting an interest of the highest order1 .. when it
leaves appreciable damage to that supposedly vital interest
unprohibited.49
The text and adoption of the 1996 UMPA demonstrates that the total prohibitions of
information-exchange imposed on Hodsen and Anderson are not of the highest
order. This can be shown in six ways.
First, if the UMPA's total ban on the speech of Hodsen and Anderson arises
because of the need to prevent information-exchange based "diagnosis," this interest
49

Church of the Lukumi Babalu Ave v. City of Hialeah. 508 U.S. 520, 546,113
S.Ct. 2217, 223,124 L.Ed.2d 472 (1993)(citations omitted).
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is substantially undermined by an exemption allowing such information to be
exchanged in a religious setting or where motivated by deeply held personal belief
so long as prescription drugs are not used.50
Second, if the UMPA's total ban on the speech of Hodsen and Anderson
arises because of the need to prevent speech about herbs and other lawful products
of nature, this interest is substantially undermined because there is no prohibition on
the availability of
numerous scientific publications and other studies that indicate the use
of herbs or products of nature, religiously based belief or prayer, and
other aspects of holistic healing have a positive impact upon the
maintenance of one's health.51
Third, if the UMPA's total ban on the speech of Hodsen and Anderson arises
because of the need to prevent advice being given advice could be given regarding
one's diet and its possible impact on health, this interest is substantially undermined
because the State of Utah allows persons who do not use a title claiming or implying
they are a certified dietician to:
integrate] and appl[y] principles derived from the sciences of food for
the development, management and provision of dietary services for
individuals and groups for meeting their health care needs. . .
[including] the evaluation of a person's dietary status,. . .the advising

U.C.A. § 58-67-305(4)
R. at 284.
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and education of persons on dietary needs,.. .the evaluation of needs,
implementation of support systems to support needs... .52
Fourth, if after Judge Eves found Hodsen was properly exempted under UMPA
in 1995, the 1996 Legislature determined Hodsen's reliance on truthful and nonmisleading information provided to him by Anderson had suddenly created a clear
and present danger justifying a total ban on their exchange of truthful and nonmisleading information, the removal of the word "advice" from the definition of the
practice of medicine in the definition of "the practice of medicine" surely undermined
such an assertion. Furthermore, in the nearly thirteen year practices of Hodsen,
Anderson and DOPL allowing such speech surely also indicate that the interest was
not of the highest order. (R. at 273,276,281) It is also interesting to note that there
had never been a complaint against Hodsen in that time. (R. at 273)
Fifth, if by happenstance, without reference to Hodsen or Anderson, the 1996
Legislature determined that reliance on truthful and non-misleading information in
giving advice regarding health matters created such a potential for misuse that a
total ban on the desired speech Hodsen and Anderson was necessary, their failure
to recognize such a need since 1969 when the first exemption regarding the sale of
herbs and other products of nature was in place undermines their new found
assertion of the compelling interest in 1996.
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It is significant that no facts

See Dietician Certification Act, § 58-49-2(4) U.C.A.
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demonstrating a new found recognition of a need for blanket public protection from
personal decisions made from truthful and non-misleading information were either
included as findings in the 1996 UPMA or presented to the trial court.
Sixth, if UMPA's total ban on the use of the "M.D." designation by Hodsen
arises because of the need to prevent any reasonable person from believing he was
licensed by the State of Utah, this interest is substantially undermined because the
State of Utah allows does not restrict medical practitioners (who are not licensed to
practice medicine in the State of Utah) from using the "M.D." a designation when
they are (1) serving in the armed forces or other federal agency and are licensed
elsewhere, (2) involved in a fellowship under the supervision of qualified persons,
(3) consult with an individual licensed in this state, or (4) be an invitee of a school,
association, or society to conduct a lecture, clinic, or demonstration of the practice
of medicine provided they do not establish a place or business or regularly engage
in the practice of the regulated profession in the state.53 These other individuals
allowed to use the "M.D." designation without Utah licensure may nor may not be

U.C A. § 58-1-307(1)(a),(b),(c),(d),(e).
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able to comply with the requirement to list the "description of the branch of the
healing arts for which the person has a license."54 Hodsen obviously cannot.
In sum, these exceptions undermine the asserted compelling nature of
UMPA's interest in prohibiting the truthful acknowledgment that one has graduated
from medical school or that there is some significant public health threat which the
1996 amendment of UMPA corrects.
2. Compelling Interests Restricting Speech and
Conduct In Other Cases Do Not Apply
Two other situations where the Utah Supreme Court has defined compelling
interests that justified restrictions on speech and conduct of citizens are
distinguishable from the State's interest in this case.
First, as it relates to commercial speech,
[t]he state obviously has a substantial and compelling interest in
protecting the public from false, deceptive, or misleading advertising.
. . .and from other aspects of solicitation that involve fraud, undue
influence, intimidation, overreaching, and other forms of vexatious
conduct.55

54

U.C.A. § 58-67-102(8)(d). The statute does not indicate whether the "licensed
physician and surgeon" must be licensed by the State of Utah.
55

In re Utah State Bar Petition for Approval of Changes in Disciplinary Rules on
Advertising. 647 P.2d 991, 993 (Utah 1982).
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All of the speech that has been exchanged between Hodsen and Anderson
regarding herbs and other products of nature is truthful and non-misleading. (R. at
331) Thus, the factual justification necessary to create a compelling interest in the
regulation of speech is not present in this case.
Second, the state has been found to have a compelling governmental interest
in "protecting its citizens from threatening or harmful behavior" of others.56 The facts
of this case show that the only products being used are lawfully sold on the open
market. Surely, Truthful and non-misleading speech regarding lawful products is not
"threatening or harmful behavior." Hodsen's use of "M.D." on a business card and
in articles — with his explanation of being an UCLA Medical school graduate,
working as a research biochemist and not in the practice of medicine — is not, in
and of itself, false, deceptive, or misleading. DOPL has claimed that
such a use of the initials "M.D." might cause a reasonable person to
believe that Hodsen is a licensed physician or surgeon and that such
use, in connection with Hodsen's businesses, may be deceptive or
misleading regarding Hodsen's status or qualifications as it applies to
DOPL's regulatory function.57
DOPL's claim that his use of M.D. "might cause a reasonable person to
believe that Hodsen is licensed", or "may be deceptive or misleading" as to his

State v. Lopez. 935 P.2d 1259,1264 (Ut.App. 1997).
R. at 281.
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licensed status is not constitutionally valid in this case because Hodsen does not
prescribe like a physician or operate like surgeon. DOPL can not show a compelling
interest in regulating Hodsen's speech because
'mere speculation or conjecture' will not suffice; rather the State 'must
demonstrate that the harms it recites are real and that its restriction will
in fact alleviate them to a material degree.'58
No evidence has been tendered or offered at either the Legislative or trial level
that would justify DOPL's total ban on Hodsen's use of the "M.D." designation. Thus,
under the undisputed facts of this case, there is no basis for recognizing compelling
governmental interests in protecting the public from false and misleading speech or
harmful conduct of others is not present in this case.
3. Utah Cases Limiting the Exercise of Express Rights
Under the State Constitution Are Distinguishable
Certain modern cases have concluded that state constitutional rights may be
regulated despite the absolute declarations to the contrary in the Utah Constitution.
Again, however, these cases are distinguishable both on questions of fact and law
from the total ban on the truthful and non-misleading speech that is imposed on
Hodsen and Anderson.
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Ibanez v. Florida Department of Business and Professional Regulation, supra.
512 U.S. at 142-143, 114 S.Ct. at 2089.
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Utah appellate courts have clarified these rationales justifying when the
exercise specifically stated constitutional rights are limited by the exercise of state
police power. In 1955, the Utah Supreme Court considered various claims of a
polygamistthat he was entitled to the protections afforded by Article I Sections 1,4
and 15 of the Utah Constitution. The Court specifically refuted the claims by using
another equally specific prohibition against polygamy contained in Article III, § 1:
Article III of our Constitution is a complete answer to appellants'
contention. The specific prohibition against polygamous or plural
marriage therein contained may not be impliedly annulled by any
interpretation of sections 1,4 and 15 of Article I inconsistent therewith.
The prohibition following as it does the guarantee of religious toleration
prevents any conclusion that the framers of our Constitution did not
intend to put a specified limitation on the language contained in Section
4, Article I of the State Constitution.59
In 1983, the Utah Supreme Court examined a claim of whether or not a trial
court could issue a "short term prior restraint on publication in the interest of assuring
a defendant has his constitutional right to a trial by an impartial jury free of outside
influences."60 While the prior restraint was not upheld because of failure to comply
with notice and hearing,61 it was noted in dictum that even though the ability to limit
the freedom of the press
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In re State ex. rel. Black, supra, 283 P.2d at 905 (Utah).

60

KUTV. Inc. v. Conder. 668 P.2d 513, 518 (Utah 1983).

61

Ja\ at 521-5.
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might be qualified where the countervailing interest is national survival
or imminent loss of life .. .[f]reedom of discussion should be given the
widest range compatible with the essential requirement of the fair and
orderly administration of justice.62
Finally, in 1993, the Utah Court of Appeals rejected an absolute challenge to the
criminal regulation of animal fighting as violative of the Defendant's right to "own and
possess property in violation of Article I, Section 1 of the Utah Constitution."63
Relying on previous 1915 Utah Supreme Court precedent regarding property, the
appellate court held that "all the constitutional provisions . . . in whatever terms
expressed, must nevertheless be construed and applied in connection with the police
power of the state."64 However, these three cases are factually and legally
distinguishable from the present case.
First, unlike the 1955 polygamy case, there is no express constitutional
prohibition against a desire to receive, use or share truthful and non-misleading
information for the formulation or expression of religious belief. To the contrary, the
only express protections which exist support Hodsen and Anderson.65

id. at 528. (Citations omitted).
West Valley City v. Streeter. 849 P.2d 613, 617-618 (Ut.App. 1993).
Id. at 618. citing State v. Briqqs. 46 Utah 288,146 P. 261, 262 (1915).
Utah Const. Article I § 4; Article III § 1.
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Second, in the 1983 case regarding prior restraint, the conflict arose between
the exercise of rights expressly guaranteed by the Utah Constitution to the press and
criminally accused.66 There are no express constitutional provisions in the Utah
Constitution that posit a potential clash between fundamental rights of Hodsen and
Anderson who are making congruent constitutional claims. Furthermore, DOPL's
constitutional claim under UMPA is limited to the Executive's duty to see "that the
laws are faithfully executed."67 Since this duty includes the "mandatory and
prohibitory"68 provisions protecting individuals against government interference with
rights specifically enumerated in the Utah Constitution's Declaration of Rights,
DOPL's statutory application of UPMA to Hodsen and Anderson directly conflicts
with DOPL's constitutional duties.
Third, unlike the 1993 case relying on the constraints that could be placed on
the exercise of inalienable rights regarding property, the claims of Hodsen and
Anderson are grounded on a right to receive, use and share truthful and non-

66

Furthermore, even if it did, the right of communication and self-determination
asserted in this case would seemingly mirror the deference given by the court to the
rights of expression and communication found in the 1983 case.
67

Utah Const., Article VII, § 5(1).

68

Utah Const., Article I, § 26.
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misleading information to formulate opinions, religious beliefs, and make choices
based on the same.
Thus, upon closer examination, the modem precedents indicating that in some
situations Utah appellate courts have restricted the exercise of expressly articulated
rights under the Utah Constitution are distinguishable as a matter of fact and law
from the unjustified total ban on specific speech between Hodsen and Anderson.
4. Previous Decisions Upholding Constitutional Challenges
to Criminal or Contempt Charges Under UMPA
Are Distinguishable
The Utah Supreme Court has reviewed several challenges to UMPA in
criminal or civil contempt cases. While the result of early precedent has been
altered by legislative decision,69 the Court has upheld the authority of the state to
prevent conduct by certain persons who were engaging in the practice of medicine.
Nonetheless, the three leading cases are legally and factually distinguishable from
the case presented by Hodsen and Anderson.
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The upholding of the right to prohibit the sale of herbs and related matters in
State v. Yee Foo Lun. 45 Utah 531,147 P. 488 (1915) was superseded in 1969 by
the inclusion of an exemption allowing those involved in the sale of herbs and other
products of nature to practice medicine as it was then defined. The right of those
included in the various exemptions to practice medicine without a license was
previously recognized by the Utah Supreme Court. See Gibb v. Dorius. 533 P.2d
299, 300 (Utah 1975).
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a. Board of Medical Examiners v. Blair
In 1921 the Utah Supreme Court upheld the right of the State of Utah to
regulate the practice of medicine and exclude the practice of chiropractic in the State
of Utah.70 Nonetheless, in the opinion the Utah Supreme Court stated therein there
were several types of situations that would justify a constitutional challenge to the
actions of the legislature. Constitutional challenges were appropriate when the laws
were "clearly unreasonable, discriminatory, or deprive[d] a citizen of some right or
privilege guaranteed by the Constitution," "violate[d] some fundamental right of the
individual," or "clearly prohibited by some provision of the Constitution, or
unreasonable and discriminatory."71
The case of Hodsen and Anderson is distinguishable from this 1921 precedent
for three reasons. First, the constitutional issues raised by in this case were not
raised in Blair. Second, the conflicts between the exercise of fundamental rights of
Hodsen and Anderson and the restrictions of the UMPA satisfy the legal standards
announced by Blair as being sufficient to challenge the constitutionality of legislation.
Third, since 1921 constitutional jurisprudence has evolved and expanded on both a
state and federal level, affording much broader protections for the individual
70

Board of Medical Examiners v. Blair. 57 Ut. 516.196 P. 221(1921).

71

Jd. at 224.
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exercise of rights of speech, religion, and personal autonomy than were applicable
when Blair was decided.
b. Utah v. Hoffman I
In 1976, the Utah Supreme Court upheld a criminal conviction for practicing
medicine without a license.72 A plethora of constitutional arguments not raised in this
case were summarily recited and apparently dismissed without significant, if any,
comment by the Utah Supreme Court.73 Not only is the factual backdrop of the
claims of Hodsen and Anderson markedly different than those raised in Hoffman I.
the assumed evils of unlicensed practice are not present in this case. Furthermore,
without question, there has been an appropriate raising of religious claims in this
case.
Preventing presumed evils of unlicensed medical practice was recognized as
being the prerogative of the Legislature. Criminal defendant Hoffman had been
involved in touching patients, applying supposed instruments to them, and using
products that were not lawfully marketed. The Utah Supreme Court stated:

72

State v. Hoffman. (Hoffman I). 558 P.2d 602 (Utah 1976).

73

"In State v. Lorrah the defendant argued that he was denied a 'due process
right of allocution.' However, we rejected his contention without analysis. This
passing reference was not intended to give allocution right constitutional
recognition." State v. Young. 853 P.2d 327, 357 (Utah 1993).
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It seems self-evident that the protection of the people of the State of
Utah against unlearned, unqualified and unproven persons who desire
to tamper with human life, health and physical and mental well-being
should be the duty of the Legislature.
Utah requires certain qualifications of persons practicing
medicine and it is obvious they lessen the evil of unqualified practice,
such as that present in this case, where the healing form is so
ridiculous that it stretches the imagination that the Legislature could
even consider it as a healing form.74
The exchange of truthful and non-misleading information for personal,
religious, and commercial reasons regarding products lawfully sold on the open
market (which for years had been allowed under a comprehensive exemption) is
entirely distinguishable from the conduct criticized in Hoffman I. The giving and
sharing of truthful information regarding lawful products of nature is an exercise of
fundamental rights that the Utah and United States Constitutions require the
Legislature to respect and allow.
Criminal defendant Hoffman also claimed that UMPA was unconstitutional
because it "denie[d] [the provider]... [the] right of conscience or abridges his free
exercise of religion." The Utah Supreme Court rejected this claim by affirming that
[t]he Legislature is protecting the people from the quacks who would
deceive them into thinking they are receiving medical relief, when, in
reality, they are being deprived of their money without the remotest
possibility of cure. This type of quackery also prevents people who
may be or are in the dire need of competent aid by their either delaying
or foregoing proper treatment. These ill people think they are being
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Hoffman I. at 605 (citation omitted).
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cured, when, in fact, they are receiving no real help. There is no
evidence the appellant is a member of any valid religious organization
or that he has valid religious beliefs to do what he did. In any event,
such belief wouldn't justify the conduct he advocates.75
For at least six reasons, the position of Hodsen and Anderson is markedly
different than that described above.
First, any reference to religious belief not justifying alternate medical
perspectives and action is mere dicta as the Court already determined that Hoffman
did not have standing to raise the claim.
Second, unlike the explicit references in this case, there was no evidence in
Hoffman I of any sincerely held or practiced religious belief. (Compare R. at 274 and
330.)
Third, as to the information Anderson and Hodsen desired to share,
[t]here are numerous scientific publications and other studies that
indicate the use of herbs or products of nature, religiously based belief
or prayer, and other aspects of holistic healing have a positive impact
upon the maintenance of one's health.
(R. at 284)

No such claim could be made for the conduct engaged in by the

defendant in Hoffman I.
Fourth, unlike the Court's perceptions of the speech in Hoffman I. since 1983,
Hodsen has been lawfully communicating his insights from years of study,

Hoffman I. 558 P.2d at 605-606.
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biochemistry training, receipt of an M.D. degree, religious and prayer; it was only
a legislative change in 1996 that made his communication unlawful.
Fifth, Hodsen's communications with Anderson have been very helpful to her
in the past (R. at 330-1); the lack of communication has damaged her physical,
emotional, and religious well-being now. (R. at 331)
Sixth, Anderson does not operate in a vacuum of information and products;
she desires the additional information for her own consideration, formulation of
religious belief, and as an adjunct to the care that she receives from a licensed
physician and acupuncturist. (R. at 329-30) All of these factors distinguish the
present case from Hoffman I.
c. Utah v. Hoffman II
In 1987, in Hoffman H.76 the Utah Supreme Court reaffirmed another criminal
conviction for violating the UMPA against the same criminal defendant that had
before the Court in Hoffman I. Again, the relevant claims rejected in Hoffman II are
distinguishable both factually and legally from the present case.
(i) Hodsen and Anderson Have Raised and Briefed
Fundamental Constitutional Violations
In Hoffman II. it was claimed that UMPA violated the First and Fourteenth
amendments of the United States Constitution. In response to the same, the per
76

State v. Hoffman. (Hoffman II). 733 P.2d 502 (Utah 1987).
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curiam opinion noted that the "defendant cite[d] no authority in support of this
contention. We find no merit to the contention."77 Part of this rejection could be
attributed to the failure of the criminal defendant to properly brief arguments.
Hodsen and Anderson, on the other hand, have cited in the trial court and on
appeal extensive authority regarding the nature and extent of their fundamental
rights, as it relates to the exchange of truthful and non-misleading personal,
religious, and commercial speech, formulation and exercise of religious beliefs, and
personal autonomy. Having done so, Hodsen and Anderson have established a
prima facie case of infringement; the burden is now on DOPL to shoulder its
constitutional burden and show that "faithful execution" of the law requires vilation
of the Utah Constitution's Declaration of Rights.
This conclusion is not modified by the generalized observation in Hoffman II
that the "Defendant has not shown and cannot show that a criminal violation of the
Act by the unlicensed prescription of treatments and cures to the gullible and unwary
public for compensation rises to the level of constitutionally protected activity."78
This statement is not binding on this court's consideration of the claims of Hodsen
and Anderson's for at least five reasons.

jd. At 504-5.
id, at 505.
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First, as the information sought and desired by Plaintiffs in this case is truthful
and not misleading, Anderson has been previously significantly benefitted by the
same, and Hodsen has significant training and experience, (M.D. degree,
undergraduate biochemistry degree, years of work with products and analysis), the
factual issues in this case are significantly different from that of Hoffman II.
Second, none of what Hodsen sells and provides information for is a
"prescription" as that term is defined by law; rather, they are herbs and other
products of nature, all lawful products on the open market.
Third, after Hoffman II was decided, the 1996 Legislature removed the term
"advise" from their definition of the practice of medicine.
Fourth, the Utah Supreme Court's reliance in Hoffman II on State v. Hoffman
L and Board v. Blair as justification for their conclusion; as noted above, both of
these cases are distinguishable from the situation of Hodsen and Anderson.
Fifth, the Colorado Supreme Court precedent cited without comment 79in
Hoffman II is also distinguishable from the present case. In dicta, the Colorado
Supreme Court observed it was applying a criminal law in a setting that "has no
discemable effect on speech or expression" and an inability to "discern any specific

People v. Jeffers. 690 P.2d 194 (Colo. 1984).
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overbroad applications, substantial or otherwise, that this statute may have."80 The
stipulated facts in this case clearly demonstrate a direct effect on speech,
expression, and overbroad application as it has been applied to Hodsen and
Anderson. Thus, the dicta of the Colorado Court is not applicable to this case.
All of the foregoing suggests that the previous rulings of the Utah Supreme
Court upholding the application of UMPA are distinguishable from the case of
Hodsen and Anderson.
(ii) As Applied to Hodsen and Anderson,
UMPA Is Overbroad
In Hoffman II. the criminal defendant also claimed that the UMPA was
overbroad.81 An overbroad law is one shown "to prohibit constitutionally protected
behavior as well as unprotected behavior."82 Although the Utah Supreme Court
rejected the overbreadth claim in Hoffman II: its rejection is distinguishable from the
case of Hodsen and Anderson for at least two reasons.
First, the Court found the criminal defendant did not have standing to make the
claim for others.83 As the case before this court is an action for injunctive and
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id. at 198 (citations omitted.)
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Hoffman II supra, 733 P.2d at 505.
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Jo\

83

id- at 505-6.
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declaratory relief, a party may make claims for third-parties;84 in all events, Anderson
can surely speak for herself on overbreadth issues.
Second, the Hodsen and Anderson have alleged that numerous constitutional
protections available under the Utah and federal constitution have been violated.
The Utah Court relied on three United States Supreme Court cases decided from
1889-1926 to uphold the claim that "[t]he right to practice medicine, to diagnose
maladies, and to prescribe for their treatment is not constitutionally superior to the
state's powerto impose comprehensive and rigid regulations on the practice."85 This
authority is distinguished by the precedent cited by Hodsen and Anderson that
recognizes their fundamental right to exchange truthful and non-misleading
information, precedent that has all been adopted after the decision of Hoffman II.
By reason of all of the foregoing, it is apparent that previous rejection by the
Utah Supreme Court of challenges to the constitutionality of UMPA are
distinguishable both factually and legally from the claims of Hodsen and Anderson.
This means that previous Utah precedent provides an insufficient foundation for
DOPL to claim in this case that they have compelling governmental interest in
prohibiting the exchange of truthful and non-misleading information between Hodsen
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See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190,193-195,97 S.Ct. 451,454-456,50 L.Ed.2d
397(1976).
85

Hoffman II. supra, jd- at 503 n. 4.
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and Anderson regarding herbs and other products of nature that are openly and
lawfully sold.

B. DOPL Has Failed to Use The Least Restrictive Means
In Prohibiting Truthful and Non-Misleading Speech of
Hodsen and Anderson
UMPA's overbroad definition of "diagnosis" which prohibits the exchange by
Hodsen and Anderson of truthful and non-misleading information regarding lawful
herbs and other products of nature, and DOPL's prohibition on Hodsen's use of the
designation "M.D.", is not the least restrictive means to address any compelling
concerns the Legislature may have. This can be shown in at least three ways.
First, the Utah Legislature has already broadly allowed without licensure for
the evaluation of a person's dietary status, dietary needs, implementation of a
support system to meet those needs, and giving advice and education regarding the
same. By adopting a 1986 Dietitian Certification Act rather than Dietitian Licensure
Act, the Legislature allowed those who do not hold themselves as a certified
dietician, to
integrate] and appl[y] principles derived from the sciences of food for
the development, management and provision of dietary services for
individuals and groups for meeting their health care needs. . .
[including] the evaluation of a person's dietary status,. . .the advising
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and education of persons on dietary needs,.. .the evaluation of needs,
implementation of support systems to support needs... ,86
As it relates to the use of herbs and other products of nature, rather than ban
the exchange of information relative to giving advice about their use, the Legislature
could similarly have allowed for the evaluation of persons, determination of needs,
and appropriate education regarding the same so long as the person providing the
information provided truthful and non-misleading information (as Hodsen and
Anderson seek here) and did not hold him or herself out as either a certified dietician
or a licensed physician or surgeon.
Second, as it relates to the total ban on Hodsen's use of the phrase M.D.,
Hodsen himself has already suggested a less restrictive alternative to ensure that
no one is injured by his use of the designation.

He has offered to place a

clarification on each business card or published article that states "Graduate of
UCLA School of Medicine" and "Research Biochemist not in Medical Practice".
DOPL has not offered any evidence that indicates either of these statements are not
true or that there is a real rather than imagined fear that individuals working with him
will believe that he is licensed by the State of Utah. (R. at 281) In addition, the
additional requirement that "the designation must additionally contain the description

See Dietician Certification Act, § 58-49-2(4) U.C.A.
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of the branch of the healing arts for which the person has a license,"87 allows no
option for a person who is not licensed. A less restrictive requirement would be to
list, if applicable, any license that is held, or an explicit disclaimer of licensure.
All of the foregoing shows that the 1996 UMPA's justifications recited in the
trial court below, if found to be compelling, with regard to the total prohibition on
Hodsen and Anderson's exchange of truthful and non-misleading information
regarding herbs and other products of nature, and Hodsen's use of the designation
"M.D.," could have been achieved by other less intrusive or less restrictive means.
CONCLUSION
The "Constitution of Utah . . . gives its citizens the 'inherent and inalienable'
right to petition a state tribunal for redress of grievances in civil actions."88 Hodsen
and Anderson have exercised this right by seeking judicial relief at a trial and now
appellate level to protect their exercise of fundamental rights of speech as well as
the formulation and exercise of religious beliefs from the total ban on truthful and
non-misleading speech imposed by UMPA and DOPL.
DOPL has offered no actual evidence demonstrating the existence of an
interest of the highest order requiring such draconian measures or, if there is a

U.C.A. § 58-67-102(8)(d).
Kish v. Wright. 562 P.2d 625, 627 (Utah 1977) (footnote omitted).
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compelling governmental interest, that UMPA has used the least restrictive means
in the case of Hodsen and Anderson to achieve the overriding objective. DOPL's
constitutional duty to see that the laws are faithfully executed does not allow Utah's
Executive or Legislative branches of government to ignore the mandatory
constitutional provisions that protect the exchange of truthful and non-misleading
information as part of one's speech as well as formulation and exercise of religious
belief.
The decision of the court below should be reversed and this matter remanded
for entry of judgment in favor of Hodsen and Anderson.
DATED this 5th day of April, 1999.

Matthew Hilton of Matthew Hilton.P.C.
Attorney for Hodsen and Anderson
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I certify that I deposited the foregoing brief for Appellants for service in the
United States mail for delivery by first class mail to the counsel for the appellees as
listed on the cover on the 5th day of April, 1999
MATTHEW HILTON, P.C.

Matthew Hilton
Attorney for Appellants
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ADDENDUM
1. Order Granting Summary Judgment in Favor of Defendants, dated June 30,
1998 and docketed June 30, 1998.
2. Certificate of Mailing and Faxing of Plaintiffs' Rule 59 Motion and
Memorandum dated July 10,1998.
3. Order executed by Judge James L. Shumate dated July 29, 1998 and
docketed on July 30,1998.
4. Notice of Appeal filed and docketed with the trial court on August 27,1998.
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THOM D. ROBERTS - 2773
BLAINE R. FERGUSON - 1059
Assistant Attorneys General
JAN GRAHAM- 1231
Attorney General
160 East 300 South
P.O. Box 140857
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0857
Telephone: (801)366-0353

IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

HORTON HODSEN, as agent for
Nutriphysiology, (previously known as
Nutribionics and Biochem Research
Services), and for himself personally, as
Horton E. Tatarian: and GAIL
ANDERSON,

ORDER GRANTING SUMMARY
JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF
DEFENDANTS

Plaintiffs,
vs.

CITY OF ST. GEORGE, a municipality
under Utah Law; and CRAIG JACKSON,
Director of the Division of Occupational and
Professional Licensing, Department of
Commerce, State of Utah in his official
capacity,

*
*
*
*
*
*

Civil No. 960500182
Judge Jamc3 L. Shumate

*

Defendants.

*

The above-entitled matter having come on regularly for hearing on Plaintiffs
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment on

Wednesday, May 13, 1998, at the hour of 2:30 p.m.. Plaintiffs appearing in person through
Horton Hodsen, and through counsel. Matt Hilton, Defendants appearing through counsel. Thorn
D. Roberts, Assistant Attorney General, and the Court having reviewed the pleadings on file
herein, including the Memorandums in support of both parties motions, and the affidavit of Gail
Anderson, and the agreed statement of facts, having been received the arguments of counsel,
including the presumption of constitutionalitv of state statutes, and good cause appearing, it is
hereby
ORDERED. ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the Plaintiffs1 Motion for Partial
Summary Judgement shall be and the same is hereby denied; it is farther
ORDERED. ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the Motion for Summary Judgment of
the Defendants shall be and the same is hereby granted; it is further
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that based upon the prior stipulation
between the Plaintiffs and Defendant City of St. George, that this Order grants final relief and
resolves all issues pending in the litigation; it is further
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECRbbD that each party shall bear their own costs
and attorney fees incurred herein.
DATED this _JQ_ day of June. 1998.
BY THE COURT:

Approved a5 to furm.

H O N J Q
District Court Judge

MATTHEW HILTON
Attorney for Plaintiff
/">.
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J NT v
Matthew Hilton (#A3655)
MATTHEW HILTON, P C .
Attorney for Plaintiffs
P.O. Box 781
Springville, UT 84663
Telephone: (801)489-1111
Facsimile: (801) 489-6000

"

""

FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
—oooOooo—
HORTON HODSEN, as agent for Nutriphysio-)
logy, (previously known as Nutribionics and
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
Biochem Research Services), and for himself ) AND FAXING
personally, as Horton E. Tatarian, and GAIL
ANDERSON,
)
Plaintiffs.
)

vs.
)
CITY OF ST. GEORGE, a municipality under
Utah Law, and CRAIG JACKSON, Director
of the Division of Occupational and
Professional Licensing, Department of
Commerce, State of Utah, in his official
capacity,
Defendants.

Civil No. 96-500182

)
)
) Judge James L. Shumate
)

—oooOooo—
Plaintiffs, by and through their undersigned counsel of record, respectfully certify
that he has sent by facsimile and first class registered mail a copy of Plaintiffs' Rule 59
motion, memorandum, and certificate of faxing and mailing to the following:

1

Thorn D. Roberts
Blaine R. Ferguson
Assistant Attorneys General
160 East 300 South
P.O. Box 149857
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-0857
Facsimile: (801) - 366- 0315
DATED this 10th day of July, 1998.
MATTHEW HILTON, PC.

Matthew Hilton
Attorney for Plaintiffs

:
IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
. ; :R7
IN AND FOR WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE,.OF UTAH

TO:

JUDGE JAMES L SHUMATE

Re: Case*

MO
" S" C^C' l R

JUDGE G. RAND BEACHAM

Plaintiff:"' "M^Q'.CC n"

JUDGE J. PHILIP EVES

vs

ttr

;

Defendant:
A Notice to Submit for Decision/ Request for Ruling was filed on the
19

..by

^ day of

attorney for plaintiff
attorney for defendant
other

The following motions are submitted for decision:
PLA's

DEF's Motion for Summary Judgment

PLA's

DEF's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings

PLA's

DEF's Motion to

PLA's

DEF's Objection to

Dismiss

Continue

*S RULING:

/^W/-/Pf J
6j^-^{A^

Dated this

i<*y *j?$t*

^lew/f p/

2 4 - <*y of

l^

Ltd
fitf-err-ft/-

t

<jji

• I9££
Distri£l^&5urt Judge

I hereby certify that on the 31 day of July^
the foregoing Court's Ruling to the following:
Thom Roberts
Blaine Ferguson
P.O. Box 140857
Salt LAKE City, Utah
Mr. Horton Hodsen
P.O. Box 1900
St. George, Utah

,19 98 , I mailed a copy of
Matthew Hilton
P.O. Box 781
^pingvine, Utah

«4b63

fir!ry Knhlmann,
175 E. 200 N.
St. George, Utah

84770

84114

84770

Gail Anderson
5830 W. Cascade
Mountain Green, uta 84050

Matthew Hilton (#3655)
MATTHEW HILTON, P.C.
Participating Attorney for the Rutherford Institute
Attorney for Plaintiffs
1220 North Main Street # 5A
P.O. Box 781
Springville, UT 84663
Telephone: (801)489-1111
Facsimile: (801)489-6000
FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
—oooOooo—
HORTON HODSEN, as agent for Nutriphysio
logy, (previously known as Nutribionics and
Biochem Research Services), and for himself
personally, as Horton E. Tatarian, and GAIL
ANDERSON,

NOTICE OF APPEAL

Plaintiffs.

vs.
Civil No. 960500182
CITY OF ST. GEORGE, a municipality under
Utah Law, and CRAIG JACKSON, Director
of the Division of Occupational and
Professional Licensing, Department of
Commerce, State of Utah, in his official
capacity,

Judge James L. Shumate

Defendants.
—oooOooo—
Notice is hereby given that the Plaintiffs and Appellants, Horton Hodsen, as agent
for Nutriphysiology, (previously known as Nutribionics and Biochem Research Services,
and for himself, personally, as Horton E. Tatarian, and Gail Anderson, through Matthew
Hilton of Matthew Hilton, P.C, appeals to the Utah Supreme Court from the final judgment

of the Honorable James L. Shumate dated June 30, 1998 and the denial of Plaintiffs'
motion brought under Rule 59 U.R.Civ. P. dated July 29, 1998 and docketed July 30, 1998.
DATED this 26th day of August, 1998.
MATTHEW HILTON, PC.

latthew Hilton

2

